László Márkusz

The violent disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991–1992 was arguably the most significant international crisis of the early post-Cold War period. Although the breakup of Yugoslavia was largely driven by internal factors, tabloid press in the successor states, even today, often create narratives according to which some outside actors galvanized what happened in the Balkans in 1990–1992. To clarify the extent of any international responsibility for the demise of this once prosperous and internationally respected country would require a separate academic assessment. What is more important for our research is the obvious sense of guilt in many Western countries for not being able to prevent the siege of Vukovar and Sarajevo, the genocide in Srebrenica, or the mass expulsion of the Kosovo Albanians. Consequently, this sense of responsibility may have significantly contributed to the mobilization of large-scale resources in managing the crisis and the post-war settlement in the former Yugoslavia. Another factor that can be identified behind active international involvement is the fear of crisis escalation and even geographical proliferation.

Yugoslavia marked a turning point in the history of international crisis management. Between 1991 and 2001, no fewer than five wars took place, and four were concluded by internationally brokered treaties, which foresaw significant engagements of the great powers, especially the United States of America and the European Union. The size of international peacekeeping forces deployed in the Balkans in the 1990s and beyond the millennium exceeded all earlier historical examples. As soon as the ink dried on the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) in December 1995, NATO immediately deployed the UN-mandated Implementation Force (IFOR) comprising some 60,000 troops. One year later, in December 1996, when the peacekeepers changed their name to Stabilisation Force (SFOR), there were still 32,000 pairs of boots on the ground. The direct participation of NATO in such a mission was also a groundbreakingly new phenomenon in the mid-1990s, just a few years after the end of the Cold War. NATO brought a new approach to crisis management. Thus, the extensive mandate the alliance brokered for itself under the military annexes of the DPA envisioned a more peace-making role than a classical peacekeeping one.

Civilian participation in crisis management also marked a new chapter in the Balkan operations of the late 1990s. The key new element was the international community’s engagement in systematic institution-building for these new countries. Thousands of diplomats, political experts, and civil servants were seconded or contracted to powerful missions, including the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the International Civilian Office (ICO), and the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). The political importance of these missions was well-demonstrated by the nomination of many seasoned European politicians to lead them, such as former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt (OHR), former Spanish Foreign Minister Carlos Westendorp (OHR), former Finnish Prime Minister Harri Holkeri (UNMIK), and former French Minister of Health Bernard Kouchner (UNMIK).

The Yugoslavian crisis coincided with tectonic changes in Europe. The Berlin Wall was brought down in 1989, followed two years later by the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The power and sphere of influence of Russia shrank, and the age of the bipolar world was over.  American President George W. Bush announced a new world order, signaling the beginning of a unipolar world dominated by the United States. As Russia was seeking its place in these new international realities, it tested the possibilities of cooperation with the West for a decade and a half. However, after a series of frustrating experiences, particularly in the case of Kosovo, and with the shift in geopolitical circumstances, Russia withdrew from active participation in Western-dominated peacekeeping and state-building projects. The last spectacular action of disengagement was the Russian departure from the Peace Implementation Council in 2021.

At the same time, the European integration process was transitioning from the economic cooperation of the European Communities to the establishment of the European Union under the Maastricht Treaty. This period saw the emergence of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, which aimed to give the EU a more significant role in international affairs, as envisioned by the member states. The Balkans became a laboratory for the newly developed Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Initially, the breakup of Yugoslavia proved to be a significant challenge. The anticipated “hour of Europe” did not turn out to be as glorious as hoped because Europe lacked the necessary military capabilities, effective political decision-making processes, and adequate crisis management infrastructure to address the ethnic conflicts in the region. However, the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo offered valuable lessons throughout the 1990s. Also, the post-war economic reconstruction and state-building efforts promised ample opportunities for Brussels to showcase the strength of the Union. Europe sought its share in the peacebuilding efforts in the Balkans. As a result, the High Representative of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, who was vested with the Bonn powers, was always required to be a European politician. This requirement also applied to the Special Representatives of the UN Secretary-General in Kosovo during the decade of international administration. The culmination of the EU’s institution-building initiatives was the launch of the EULEX rule of law mission in Kosovo in 2009, which became the largest civilian mission under the Common Security and Defence Policy.

Other international organisations, such as the UN, OSCE, and the Council of Europe, also sought justification for their existence in the post-Cold War era. Therefore, they were all receptive to supporting state-building experiments. The UN provided an ideological rationale for state-building in an early stage. The goal was to surpass the limited ambitions of early Cold War time peacekeeping missions, as they often only froze conflicts but offered no lasting and viable solutions, sometimes not even providing relief for the population in dire humanitarian situations, which is characteristic of post-conflict areas. Therefore, the United Nations Agendas on Peace, Development and Democratisation, starting in 1992, stressed the long-term involvement of international organisations in political institution-building and governance. The ‘Agenda for Peace’ introduced terms such as post-conflict peace-building, preventive diplomacy, and democratization, assuming a leading UN role in these areas. This was also the time when liberal democracy claimed a historical victory, and democratic practices, good governance, and economic development were believed to provide a general recipe for addressing conflicts in different parts of the world. This theory laid the groundwork for integrating the classical military aspect of conflict management with a strong civilian component, which aims at political consolidation, economic development, and humanitarian work, especially for facilitating refugee return.

Conflict management has been a global challenge, providing the UN with numerous opportunities to implement its strategies in regions such as Cambodia, East Timor, and Afghanistan. Among the most significant and ambitious international efforts at state-building and democratization have been those in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. International involvement in Bosnia began in 1992, but state-building started with the US-brokered Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) in 1995 and has continued for nearly 30 years. International administration in Kosovo began in 1999 and effectively concluded in 2017 with the end of the EULEX executive mandate.

While the absence of renewed armed conflict seems to justify international efforts broadly, the results have been mixed and sometimes even controversial. When compared to the resources invested, the outcomes may appear disappointing. However, it is essential to conduct a careful assessment before drawing any conclusions. Common mistakes made by observers and analysts include setting excessively high expectations, demonstrating impatience, ignoring historical contexts, prioritizing sensationalism, and being swayed by political agendas.